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Explaining Job Polarization:  
Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring †
By Maarten Goos, Alan Manning, and Anna Salomons *
This paper documents the pervasiveness of job polarization in 
16 Western European countries over the period 1993–2010. It then 
develops and estimates a framework to explain job polarization 
using routine-biased technological change and offshoring. This 
model can explain much of both total job polarization and the split 
into  within-industry and between-industry components. (JEL J21, 
J23, J24, M55, O33)
The “Skill-Biased Technological Change” hypothesis (SBTC)—see Katz and 
Autor (1999); Goldin and Katz (2008, 2009); and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for 
excellent overviews—arose from the observation that demand is shifting in favor 
of more educated workers. In spite of its success in explaining many decades of 
data, however, SBTC cannot explain the recent phenomenon of job polarization as 
documented by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008) and Autor and Dorn (2013) 
for the United States and Goos and Manning (2007) for the United Kingdom. Job 
polarization has also been documented for Germany (Spitz-Oener 2006; Dustmann, 
Ludsteck, and Schönberg 2009) and there are indications it is pervasive in European 
countries (Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2009; Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 
2014). The first contribution of this paper is to show that job polarization is pervasive 
across advanced economies by showing it holds in 16 Western European countries.
The main hypotheses put forward to explain job polarization are that recent tech-
nological change is biased toward replacing labor in routine tasks (what we call rou-
tine-biased technological change (RBTC)) and that there is task offshoring (itself 
partially influenced by technological change), and that both of these forces decrease 
the demand for middling relative to high-skilled and low-skilled occupations (Autor, 
Levy, and Murnane 2003; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006, 2008; Goos and Manning 
2007; Autor and Dorn 2013). The second contribution of this paper is to develop and 
estimate a model—that has its roots in the canonical model first developed by Katz 
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and Murphy (1992) for the analysis of SBTC—to quantify the importance of RBTC 
and offshoring in explaining job polarization. Our estimates suggest that RBTC is 
much more important than offshoring. We show that this model explains not just 
overall job polarization but also its within-industry and between-industry compo-
nents that are both empirically important. Within each industry there is a shift away 
from routine occupations leading to within-industry job polarization. But RBTC 
also leads to significant between-industry shifts in the structure of employment. On 
the one hand, an industry affected by RBTC will use less employment to produce a 
given level of output which will cause occupational employment shares to polarize 
even if output shares do not. On the other hand, industries intense in routine tasks 
will see a larger decrease in relative costs and output prices leading to a shift in 
product demand toward these industries (as was first pointed out by Baumol 1967). 
We show that, in our data, this effect attenuates between-industry job polarization 
but does not overturn it.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the data. 
Section II shows how the occupational employment structure between 1993 and 2010 
in 16 Western European countries is polarizing both within and between industries. 
Section III presents our economic model. Section IV finally shows that the model can 
explain a large part of the changes in employment shares across occupations, both the 
total change and the split into within-industry and between-industry components.
I. Data
In this section we describe the data sources of our measures of employment, the 
routineness and offshorability of occupations as well as our measures of industry 
output and costs.1
A. Employment
Our main data source for employment is the harmonized individual level European 
Union Labour Force Survey (ELFS) for the 17-year period 1993–2010. The ELFS 
contains data on employment status, weekly hours worked, two-digit International 
Standard Occupational Classification (ISCO) codes and one-digit industry codes 
from the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE 
revision 1). Throughout this paper, we use weekly hours worked as the measure 
of employment, although our results are not affected by using persons employed 
instead. Out of the 28 countries available in the ELFS, we exclude 11 new EU mem-
ber countries and Iceland because of limited data availability. Because ELFS data 
for Germany only start in 2003, we use data from the German Federal Employment 
Agency’s SIAB dataset which is a 2 percent random sample of social security records 
for the period 1993–2008 instead. In sum, data for the following 16 European coun-
tries is used in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
1 See online Appendix A for details on the measures discussed in this section.
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Table 1 lists occupations ordered by their mean wage rank.2 Column 1 of Table 1 
gives the 1993 employment share of each occupation after pooling employment 
across the 16 countries. For each occupation, column 2 of Table 1 gives the percent-
age point change in the employment share between 1993 and 2010; we return to 
these numbers below.
B. Routineness and Offshorability of Occupations
Following the recommendation of Autor (2013) that researchers use, as far as 
is possible, off-the-shelf measures for the content of occupations, our measure of 
the routineness of an occupation is the Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index used 
by Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013)3 mapped into our 
European occupational classification and normalized to have zero mean and unit 
standard deviation. The resulting RTI index is reported in column 3 of Table 1. RTI 
is highest at 2.24 for office clerks (41) and lowest at −1.52 for managers of small 
enterprises (13).
While the literature seems to be settling on using the RTI measure as the best way 
to capture the impact of recent technological progress, there is, as yet, no similar 
consensus measure about an occupation’s offshorability to capture the impact of 
offshoring. We use a measure taken from Blinder and Krueger (2013).4 Using the 
individual level Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII) dataset, Blinder and 
Krueger (2013) report three measures of offshorability: one self-reported, one a 
combination of self-reported questions made internally consistent, and the last one 
which is based on professional coders’ assessment of the ease with which each 
occupation could potentially be offshored. Blinder and Krueger (2013) conclude 
that their third measure is preferred. For our analyses, we convert this preferred 
measure into our European occupational classification and normalize it to have zero 
mean and unit standard deviation. The resulting values are reported in column 4 of 
Table 1. The most offshorable are machine operators and assemblers (82) at 2.35 
and the least offshorable are drivers and mobile plant operators (83) at −1.
2 To rank occupations, we use wages from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), since the ELFS does not contain any earnings infor-
mation. See online Appendix A for more details on our wage measures.
3 This RTI measure is based on Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008). 
The five original DOT task measures of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) are combined to produce three task 
aggregates: the Manual task measure corresponds to the DOT variable measuring an occupation’s demand for 
“eye-hand-foot coordination”; the Routine task measure is a simple average of two DOT variables, “set limits, 
tolerances and standards” measuring an occupation’s demand for routine cognitive tasks, and “finger dexterity,” 
measuring an occupation’s use of routine motor tasks; and the Abstract task measure is the average of two DOT 
variables: “direction control and planning,” measuring managerial and interactive tasks, and “GED Math,” measur-
ing mathematical and formal reasoning requirements. From these three measures the Routine Task Intensity (RTI) 
index is constructed as the difference between the log of Routine tasks and the sum of the log of Abstract and the 
log of Manual tasks.
4 Online Appendix A provides some additional evidence in support of using this measure. In particular, we use 
data on actual instances of offshoring by European companies recorded in fact sheets compiled in the European 
Restructuring Monitor. These fact sheets contain considerable detail about offshoring events including which occu-
pations are being offshored. We processed these fact sheets to construct an index of actual offshoring by occupa-
tion. We then regress these measures of actual offshoring by occupation on Blinder and Krueger’s (2013) preferred 
measure of an occupation’s offshorability to find that they are strongly and positively correlated. Moreover, we 
show that competing indices of an occupation’s offshorability that have also been used in the literature do not have 
the same explanatory power.
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Table 1—Levels and Changes in the Shares of Hours Worked, 1993–2010
Occupations ranked by mean 
European wage
ISCO
code
Average 
employment 
share in 1993 
(in percent)
Percentage 
point change 
1993–2010 RTI
Offshor-
ability Within Between
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High-paying occupations   31.67 5.62 −0.72 −0.12 3.11 2.51
Corporate managers 12 5.65 0.59 −0.75 −0.32 0.49 0.10
Physical, mathematical, and
 engineering professionals
21 2.93 1.36 −0.82 1.05 1.11 0.25
Life science and health
 professionals 
22 2.01 0.57 −1.00 −0.76 0.23 0.34
Other professionals 24 2.79 1.38 −0.73 0.21 0.67 0.71
Managers of small enterprises 13 4.16  0.17 −1.52 −0.63 −0.03 0.19
Physical, mathematical, and  
 engineering associate 
 professionals 
31 4.44  0.21 −0.40 −0.12 0.22 −0.01
Other associate professionals 34 7.24 0.79 −0.44 0.10 0.27 0.53
Life science and health
 associate professionals 
32 2.45 0.55 −0.33 −0.75 0.14 0.41
Middling occupations   46.75 −9.27 0.69 0.24 −4.77 −4.50
Stationary plant and related
 operators 
81 1.70 −0.25 0.32 1.59 0.06 −0.31
Metal, machinery, and related
 trade work 
72 8.78 −2.08 0.46 −0.45 −0.81 −1.26
Drivers and mobile plant
 operators 
83 5.03 −0.48 −1.50 −1.00 −0.11 −0.38
Office clerks 41 10.60 −2.06 2.24 0.40 −2.34 0.28
Precision, handicraft, craft
 printing, and related trade 
 workers
73 1.45 −0.54 1.59 1.66 −0.30 −0.24
Extraction and building trades
 workers 
71 7.35 −0.64 −0.19 −0.93 0.39 −1.03
Customer service clerks 42 2.13 0.06 1.41 −0.25 −0.14 0.20
Machine operators and 
 assemblers 
82 5.99 −1.63 0.49 2.35 −0.56 −1.07
Other craft and related trade 
 workers 
74 3.72 −1.66 1.24 1.15 −0.96 −0.69
Low-paying occupations   21.56 3.65 −0.08 −0.84 1.66 1.99
Laborers in mining,
 construction, manufacturing,
 and transport
93 4.26 −0.55 0.45 −0.66 0.01 −0.55
Personal and protective service
 workers 
51 6.86 2.36 −0.60 −0.94 0.65 1.71
Models, salespersons, and 
 demonstrators 
52 6.06 −0.11 0.05 −0.89 0.29 −0.40
Sales and service elementary
 occupations
91 4.38 1.95 0.03 −0.81 0.72 1.23
Notes: Occupations are ordered by their mean wage across the 16 European countries across all years. Columns 1, 
2, 5, and 6: all countries, long difference 1993–2010, employment pooled across countries. Columns 3 and 4: mea-
sures rescaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1, a higher value means an occupation is more routine intense (col-
umn 3) or more offshorable (column 4). The RTI index in column 3 is based on the five original DOT task measures 
in Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and is identical to the index used in Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn, 
and Hanson (2013). The offshorability measure in column 4 is taken from Blinder and Krueger (2013) and is based 
on professional coders’ assessment of the ease with which an occupation could potentially be offshored. Columns 5 
and 6: shiftshare analysis of occupational employment share changes, within and between industries.
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The correlation coefficient between the RTI and offshorability measure is 0.46 
and statistically significant suggesting that routineness and offshorability may be 
linked.5 But there are also some differences. For example, physical, mathemati-
cal, and engineering professionals (21) is ranked as nonroutine but at the same 
time highly offshorable whereas office clerks (41) are very routine but not very 
offshorable.
C. Industry Output, Prices, and Costs
Measures of industry output, industry marginal costs, and relative output prices 
are taken from the OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis. Each of our 
16 countries except Ireland is included in STAN. This data covers the period 1993–
2010 for all 15 of these countries. STAN uses an industry list for all countries based 
on the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities, 
Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3) which covers all activities including services and is com-
patible with NACE revision 1 used in the ELFS.
From STAN we use production, defined as the value of goods or services pro-
duced in a year, whether sold or stocked. To obtain output, production is deflated 
using industry-country-year specific price indices also available from STAN. To 
obtain a measure of industry average costs—which in our model presented below 
will also be industry marginal costs—we use STAN’s net operating surplus data in 
addition to production and output, and take the difference between production and 
net operating surplus and divide this difference by output.
II. Job Polarization
To provide a snapshot of changes in the European job structure, columns 1 and 
2 of Table 1 show the employment shares of occupations and their percentage 
point changes between 1993 and 2010 after pooling employment for each occupa-
tion across our 16 European countries.6 This table shows that the highest-paying 
managerial (12,13), professional (21 to 24), and associate professional (31 to 34) 
occupations experienced the fastest increases in their employment shares. On the 
other hand, the employment shares of office clerks (41), craft and related trades 
workers (71 to 74), and plant and machine operators and assemblers (81 to 83), 
which pay around the median occupational wage, have declined. Similar to patterns 
found for the United States and United Kingdom, there has been an increase in the 
employment shares for some low-paid service workers (51, of which the main task 
consists of providing services related to travel, catering, and personal care; but not 
5 This is in line with Blinder and Krueger (2013) who find that offshorability is conceptually distinct from, 
though related to, an occupation’s routineness. The authors argue that it is likely that jobs that can be broken down 
into simple, routine tasks are easier to offshore than jobs requiring complex thinking, judgment, and human interac-
tion. However, a wide variety of complex tasks that involve high levels of skill and human judgment can also be 
offshored via telecommunication devices. Consequently, Blinder and Krueger (2013) conclude that their measure of 
offshorability is more germane to the offshoring issue than is the question of routineness but that the two criteria do 
overlap. As our RTI and offshorability measures are undoubtedly imperfect, and the extent of measurement error in 
them may also be different, one has to be careful in one’s claims about the ability to distinguish beyond reasonable 
doubt the separate effects of RBTC and offshoring.
6 Instead of pooling countries, reporting unweighted average employment shares and their changes across coun-
tries would not qualitatively change the numbers in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.
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52, of which the main task consists of selling goods in shops or at markets) and 
some  low-paid elementary occupations (91), which are service elementary work-
ers including cleaners, domestic helpers, doorkeepers, porters, security personnel, 
and garbage collectors; but not 93, which mainly includes low-educated laborers 
in manufacturing performing simple tasks including product-sorting and packing 
and unpacking produce). This is an indication that the existing evidence to date that 
there is job polarization in the United States, United Kingdom, or Germany is not an 
exception but rather the rule.
There may, of course, be heterogeneity across countries in the extent of job polar-
ization. For ease of exposition, Table 2 groups the occupations into the three groups 
listed in Table 1: the four lowest-paid occupations, nine middling occupations, and 
the eight highest-paid occupations. We then compute the percentage point change in 
employment share for each of these groups in each country between 1993 and 2010. 
Table 2 confirms that employment polarization is pervasive across European coun-
tries—the share of high-paying and low-paying occupations has increased relative 
to the middling occupations in each country.7
The final two columns of Table 1 decompose the overall change in employ-
ment shares reported in column 2 of Table 1 into a within-industry (column 5) and 
between-industry (column 6) component. For the group of eight highest-paid and 
four lowest-paid occupations the within-industry and between-industry components 
are positive, and for the group of nine middling occupations they are both negative. 
What this shows is that overall job polarization can be split into a within-industry 
and between-industry component, each of which is too large quantitatively to be 
ignored.
In sum, the phenomenon of job polarization is pervasive across advanced econo-
mies. Moreover, overall job polarization is driven by job polarization both within 
and between industries. The purpose of the model presented in the next section is 
to explain total job polarization and, more ambitiously, its split into within-industry 
and between-industry components.
III. A Framework to Understand Job Polarization
Our model is a two-stage setup for modeling the production process in which out-
put in different industries is produced from a set of tasks, and where each task is pro-
duced using a technology that combines labor from a specific occupation and other 
inputs. To capture RBTC and offshoring, the cost of these other inputs changes over 
time according to the routineness and offshorability of a task. This type of two-stage 
setup has also been used in recent work by, among others, Teulings (1995, 2005); 
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003); Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006); Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008); Costinot and Vogel (2010); Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011); and Autor and Dorn (2013). In relation to this literature our approach can be 
thought of as positioned between the very empirical analyses—that either estimate 
only within-industry effects, so can say nothing about the between-industry effects 
that we do find are important (e.g., Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 2014), or 
7 One might be concerned that our results are sensitive to the start and end years. However, online Appendix A 
presents the employment shares for all years showing that changes are close to linear trends.
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 reduced-form estimates that can say little about the transmission mechanism (e.g., 
Autor and Dorn 2013)—and the purely theoretical studies (e.g., Costinot and Vogel 
2010) that put restrictions on the way technology varies across industries to derive 
comparative statics predictions (something that is impossible without imposing 
some structure on the problem) but cannot say anything about whether those restric-
tions are satisfied in practice. All of these approaches have their advantages and 
disadvantages but we think our combination of theory and empirics is a useful one.
A. The Production of Goods
Assume that output in industry i is produced by combining certain common build-
ing blocks that we will call tasks. In general, assume the following CES production 
function for industry i using tasks  T 1 , … ,  T ij , … ,  T J as inputs:
(1)  Y i ( T i1 , … ,  T ij , … ,  T iJ ) =  [ ∑  
j=1
J
 [  β ij  T ij ]  
η−1
 _η   ]  η _ η−1  with η > 0,
where η is the elasticity of substitution between tasks in goods production and  β ij is 
the intensity of the use of task j in industry i. The corresponding cost function for 
producing  Y i is given by:
  C i I( c 1 T, … ,  c j T , … ,  c J T |  Y i ) =  Y i  c i I( c 1 T, … ,  c j T ,  … ,  c J T ),
Table 2—Initial Shares of Hours Worked and Percentage Changes over 1993–2010 (by Country)
Four lowest-paying 
occupations
Nine middling 
occupations
Eight highest-paying 
occupations
Employment 
share in 1993 
(in percent)
Percentage 
point change 
1993–2010
Employment 
share in 1993 
(in percent)
Percentage 
point change 
1993–2010
Employment 
share in 1993 
(in percent)
Percentage 
point change 
1993–2010
Austria 21.82 6.36 51.61 −10.44 26.57 4.08
Belgium 17.49 3.00 48.50 −12.07 34.01 9.08
Denmark 24.09 1.73 39.70 −10.30 36.21 8.56
Finland 20.24 −1.50 39.69 −10.60 40.06 12.10
France 19.92 4.19 46.69 −8.60 33.39 4.41
Germany 20.71 2.37 48.03 −6.74 31.26 4.37
Greece 21.66 4.81 47.81 −10.65 30.54 5.84
Ireland 21.13 3.68 48.21 −14.85 30.66 11.17
Italy 27.01 6.06 51.04 −10.59 21.94 4.53
Luxembourg 21.70 −2.38 49.91 −10.76 28.40 13.15
Netherlands 16.78 1.99 37.90 −7.56 45.33 5.57
Norway 22.85 4.73 38.82 −8.47 38.34 3.74
Portugal 25.75 0.73 47.46 −4.86 26.78 4.13
Spain 28.02 1.01 48.67 −11.95 23.30 10.93
Sweden 21.82 1.52 41.98 −9.55 36.20 8.03
United Kingdom 16.88 4.17 43.64 −10.94 39.49 6.77
Notes: Long difference 1993–2010. Occupational employment pooled within each country. Occupations are 
grouped according to the mean European occupational wage as in Table 1.
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with  c j T for j = 1, … , J the unit cost of task j and  c i I( c 1 T, … ,  c j T , … ,  c J T ) industry 
marginal cost. The demand for task j conditional on industry output  Y i is then given 
by
(2)  T ij ( c 1 T, … ,  c j T , … ,  c J T |  Y i ) =  Y i  t ij ( c 1 T, … ,  c j T , … ,  c J T),
where  t ij ( c 1 T, … ,  c j T , … ,  c J T ) is the demand for task j to produce one unit of good i.
B. The Production of Tasks
We assume that output of task j is produced using labor of occupation j and some 
other inputs. The other inputs could be computers to capture recent technological 
change or offshored overseas employment to capture offshoring or some combina-
tion of both. We proceed by assuming the other input is one-dimensional but that is 
just for simplicity and explicitly accounting for multiple inputs only adds algebraic 
complication. If industry i uses domestic labor of occupation j,  N ij , and the other 
input,  K ij , we assume that the total production of task j is given by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function that is common across industries:8
(3)  T ij ( N ij ,  K ij ) =  N ij κ  K ij 1−κ with 0 < κ < 1.
The corresponding cost function for producing  T ij is given by
  C ij T( w j ,  r j |  T ij ) =  T ij  c j T ( w j ,  r j ),
with  w j and  r j the prices of  N ij and  K ij respectively. Note that it is assumed that the 
technology to produce task j together with factor prices  w j and  r j are common across 
industries such that the marginal cost to produce task j has no subscript i.9 The 
demand for occupation j conditional on task output  T ij is then given by
(4)  N ij ( w j ,  r j |  T ij ) =  T ij  n j ( w j ,  r j ),
where  n j ( w j   r j ) is the demand for occupation j to produce one unit of task j.
We model RBTC and offshoring as affecting the costs of the inputs other than 
domestic labor, in particular that
(5)  ∂ log  r jt  _∂ t =  γ R  R j +  γ F  F j ,
with  R j the routineness and  F j the offshorability measure discussed in Section I. 
Given that our measures  R j and  F j are increasing in routineness and offshorabil-
ity respectively, we expect  γ R < 0 and  γ F < 0. Note that we model the impact of 
RBTC and offshoring as being in the cost of employing an effective unit of the other 
8 The original version of this paper—Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010)—allowed for a CES task production 
function. Online Appendix B shows that this specification makes little difference to the conclusions.
9 This assumption has been used in other models (e.g., Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008).
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input—it would be observationally equivalent to model it as changes in the produc-
tion function not prices.
Substituting equation (2) into (4), taking logs and using equation (5) gives an 
expression for the log demand for occupation j in industry i conditional on industry 
output and marginal costs (and adding country and time subscripts):
(6) log  N ijct = −  [ (1 − κ) + κη ]  log  w jct 
 +  [ 1 − η ] [1 − κ] [ γ R  R j +  γ F  F j ] × time
 + η log  c ict I + log  Y ict + (η − 1) log  β ijc +  ε ijct .
If η < 1,  γ R < 0 and  γ F < 0 such that  [ 1 − η ] [1 − κ] [ γ R  R j +  γ F  F j ] is negative 
for more routine and offshorable occupations, equation (6) predicts job polarization 
within each industry.
Table 3 reports some estimates of equation (6). Column 1 gives estimates of 
[ 1 − η ] [1 − κ] γ R as the coefficient on our RTI measure interacted with a linear 
time trend and of  [ 1 − η ] [1 − κ] γ F as the coefficient on our offshorability measure 
interacted with a linear time trend, while modeling occupational wages by a set of 
country, occupation, and time dummies10 and industry output and marginal costs by 
industry-country-year dummies. The coefficient on RTI is negative and significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of the estimated effects is 
such that an occupation that is one standard deviation more intense in RTI is grow-
ing 0.90 percentage points less fast each year. The coefficient on offshorability is 
also negative, but small in absolute value and not statistically significantly different 
from zero.
The estimates in column 1 of Table 3 do not allow us to retrieve an estimate of η 
that will be necessary for the shift-share analysis in Section IV. To do this, column 2 
of Table 3 replaces the industry-country-year dummies with our measures of indus-
try marginal costs and industry output described in Section I above. The coefficient 
on log industry marginal cost—which is an estimate of η—is positive and significant 
as is predicted by our model. However, the coefficient on log industry output is less 
than unity which rejects our assumption of constant returns to scale in goods pro-
duction. This is perhaps not surprising given that short-run movements in output are 
often not reflected in employment, so column 3 of Table 3 restricts the coefficient on 
log industry output to be equal to unity. This does not affect the RTI and offshorabil-
ity coefficients and results in an estimate of 0.90 for η. Column 4 of Table 3 excludes 
offshorability from the regression equation to examine the impact of RBTC uncon-
ditional on offshoring, and this does not affect the RTI point estimate. Column 5 of 
Table 3 excludes RTI from the regression equation instead to examine the impact of 
10 Online Appendix B shows results are similar if wages are included. They are excluded here because the quality 
of wage data by country, occupation, and time is poor and because of concerns about their endogeneity (see Firpo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux 2011 and Ebenstein et al. forthcoming for US evidence on this). The earlier version of the 
paper—Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010)—found little evidence for the endogeneity of wages as is perhaps 
plausible given the institutions of wage determination in Europe (though see Hummels et al. 2014 for evidence for 
Denmark that a firm’s wages respond to offshoring by that firm).
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offshoring unconditional on RBTC. The impact of offshoring is negative and sig-
nificant in this case but this may well be because it is positively correlated with RTI 
and the earlier columns make clear that it loses a “horse race” against RTI. In sum, 
this is evidence that within industries there is a shift in relative demand away from 
occupations that are more routine and offshorable with the former being the much 
more important effect.11
C. The Demand for Goods
The analysis so far has been for given industry output. To account for the labor 
demand effects induced from shifts in relative product demand, we need to go fur-
ther and not condition on industry output. To do this, assume that the log demand 
for industry output is given by
(7) log  Y ict = −ε log  P ict + log  Y ct +  ξ ict ,
with  P ict the industry-country-year specific price indices available from STAN 
relative to a country-year aggregate price index, and  Y ct a measure of aggregate 
income. This specification could be derived from an underlying CES utility function 
in which consumers have homothetic preferences.12 Estimating equation (7) gives a 
point estimate for ε of 0.42 with a standard error of 0.07.
11 This conclusion is robust to numerous sensitivity tests by estimating models separately for subsets of coun-
tries, industries, and time periods. See online Appendix C for details.
12 The assumption of homotheticity implies that changes in both the level and the distribution of aggregate 
income have no effect on the distribution of demand across industries. This might be thought unduly restrictive 
because it has been argued (Manning 2004; and Mazzolari and Ragusa 2013) that job polarization might be caused 
by increasing inequality leading to increased demand for low-skill service sector jobs from high-wage workers to 
free up more of their time for market work. However, we cannot find evidence for non-homotheticity at our level 
of industry aggregation (Autor and Dorn 2013 arrive at similar conclusions). See online Appendix D for details.
Table 3—Estimating Labor Demand Dependent Variable: log (Hours worked/1,000)
Linear time-trend interacted with: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RTI −0.900*** −0.888*** −0.866*** −0.868***
(0.126) (0.135) (0.141) (0.129) —
Offshorability −0.013 −0.005 −0.006 −0.383**
(0.159) (0.175) (0.180) — (0.165)
log industry marginal costs 0.854*** 0.895*** 0.895*** 0.899***
— (0.145) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
log industry output 0.142** 1 1 1
— (0.061)
Observations 48,139 44,062 44,062 44,062 44,062
R2 0.954 0.947
Notes: Point estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) on RTI and offshorability have been multiplied by 100. 
All regressions include occupation-industry-country fixed effects. The regression in column 1 contains industry-
country-year fixed effects and regressions in columns 2–5 contain year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
by occupation-industry-country.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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If there is monopolistic competition within each industry we have that 
log  P ict = log μ + log  c ict I with μ > 1 the price mark-up. Using this and substitut-
ing equation (7) into (6) gives
(8)    log  N ijct = −  [ (1 − κ) + κη ]  log  w jct 
 + [1 − η][1 − κ] [ γ R  R j +  γ F  F j ] × time
 + [η − ε] log  c ict I + log  Y ct − ε log μ 
 + (η − 1) log  β ijc +  ε ijct ,
which is an equation we will use in the next section.
IV. Explaining Job Polarization within and between Industries
Our aim in this section is to consider how much of job polarization both within 
and between industries that was documented in Table 1 can be explained by our 
model above. To see how we can do this, note that in a standard shift-share analysis 
the share of occupation j in total employment at time t,  s jt , can be written as (drop-
ping country subscripts for simplicity)
(9)  s jt =  ∑ 
i=1
I
  τ it  s j | it ,
where  s j | it is the share of occupation j in total employment of industry i at time 
t, and  τ it is the share of employment in industry i in total employment at time t. 
Differentiating (9) we have that
(10)  ∂ s jt  _∂ t =  ∑ i=1
I
  τ it  s j | it [  ∂ log  s j | it  _∂ t +  ∂ log  τ it  _∂ t ] ,
where the first term in square brackets is the within-industry and the second term is 
the between-industry contribution to the total change in occupational employment 
shares.
Now consider the predictions of our model for the within-industry and 
 between-industry components. To keep the algebra to a minimum we will assume 
there is only RBTC, but the same method can be used to analyze offshoring and our 
empirical analysis below accounts for RBTC as well as offshoring simultaneously. 
From (8) we can write the first term in square brackets in equation (10) as
(11)  ∂ log  s j | it  _∂ t =  
∂ log  N ijt 
 _∂ t −  ∑  j′ =1
J
  s  j′ | it  ∂ log  N i j′ t  _∂ t 
 = [1 − η][1 − κ] γ R ( R j −  ∑  j′ =1
J
  s  j′ | it  R  j′  )
 = [1 − η][1 − κ] γ R ( R j −  R it I ),
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with  R it I =  ∑  j′ =1 J  s  j′ | it  R  j′  the average of  R j in industry i where the weights used, 
 s  j′ | it , are the shares of different occupations in the industry at time t, i.e., is the aver-
age level of routineness across occupations in industry i.
Now consider the second term in square brackets in equation (10). From (8) we 
have that
(12)  ∂ log  τ it  _∂ t =   ∑ j=1
J
 s j | it  ∂ log  N ijt  _∂ t  −  ∑  j′ =1
I
  s  j′ t  ∂ log  N  j′ t  _∂ t 
 = [1 − ε][1 − κ] γ R ( R it I −  ∑  i′ =1
I
 τ  i′ t  R  i′ t I )
 = [1 − ε][1 − κ] γ R ( R it I −  R t agg ),
with  R t agg defined to be the average of  R it I across industries where the weights used, τ  i′ t , are the shares of employment in industry i in total employment at time t.13
Substituting equations (11) and (12) into (10), we have that the shift-share decom-
position can be written as
(13)  ∂ s jt  _∂t =  s jt [1 − η][1 − κ] γ R 
 ×   { ( R j −  ∑ 
i=1
I
  s i | jt  R it I ) +  1 − ε _1 − η ∑  i=1I s i | jt ( R it I −  R t agg ) } ,
with  s i | jt the share of occupation j in industry i at time t. The term before the curly 
brackets,  s jt [ 1 − η ] [1 − κ] γ R , is occupation j’s share of total employment,  s jt , mul-
tiplied by the RTI coefficient in Table 3, [1 − η][1 − κ] γ R , which is negative.14
The first term in the curly brackets,  ( R j −  ∑ i=1 I  s i | jt  R it I ) , is the model’s prediction 
of the within-industry component. It captures the shift away from or toward occupa-
tion j within industries by subtracting from  R j the average routineness across indus-
tries in which occupation j is employed. For example, if in every industry in which 
occupation j is used we have that  R j is high relative to all other occupations, one 
would expect a large shift away from occupation j within each of those industries.
The second term in the curly brackets, [1 − ε]/[1 − η] ∑ i=1 I  s i | jt ( R it I −  R t agg ), 
is the between-industry component. This can be thought of as having two parts. 
The first (which will be the total effect if industry outputs are fixed, i.e., assum-
ing that product demands are perfectly inelastic or ε = 0) comes from variation in 
the employment intensity of output induced by RBTC. RBTC will typically cause 
less routine employment to be used in the production of a given level of output, so 
13 This follows from the fact that ∂ log  c ict I /∂ t = [1 − κ] γ R ∑ j=1 J  s j | i  R j and the simplifying assumption that the 
share of task j in industry costs is the same as the share of employment of occupation j in that industry.
14 Note that the predicted changes from equation (13) are precisely the effects from RBTC and offshoring and 
cannot be explained by any industry or industry-time specific changes in employment shares.
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 differences in routineness across industries will cause industry employment shares 
to change even if industry output shares do not. For example, to produce the same 
level of output the demand for an occupation falls by more in industries that are 
routine intense because  R it I −  R t agg and therefore 1/[1 − η] ∑ i=1 I  s i | jt ( R it I −  R t agg ) 
will be larger. Because routine occupations are concentrated in routine intensive 
industries by definition, this channel predicts job polarization between industries if 
routine occupations are middling occupations.
The second part of the between-industry effect (i.e., assuming that ε > 0) comes 
from changes in the distribution of output induced by the changes in relative output 
prices and therefore shifting consumer demands that follow from RBTC. For exam-
ple, routine intensive industries will see a larger fall in industry costs and therefore 
relative output prices. This will increase the demand for routine intensive goods 
and therefore the demand for all occupations used in routine intensive industries. 
Because this implies that −ε/[1 − η] ∑ i=1 I  s i | jt ( R it I −  R t agg ) will be larger in abso-
lute value for more routine occupations, this channel will tend to attenuate the first 
part of the between-industry effect though will not overturn it as long as ε < 1 as 
our estimate for ε of 0.42 suggests.15
To summarize, equation (13) shows how a shift-share analysis—that is commonly 
thought of as merely an accounting exercise—can be rooted in our framework. In 
particular, equation (13) shows how changes in occupational employment shares 
can be decomposed into a within-industry and between-industry component and 
this is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the conventional wisdom from the SBTC 
literature is that skill upgrading is almost entirely a within-industry phenomenon 
but equation (13) shows that RBTC has an important between-industry component 
as well. Secondly, the within-industry and between-industry effects in equation (13) 
are economically meaningful and depend on the different elasticities in the model. 
In particular, our estimates are such that RBTC and offshoring lead to job polariza-
tion within and between industries, but one could easily imagine different elastici-
ties—perhaps capturing different episodes of technological change or globalization 
and types of goods produced or traded—to come to different predictions.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 4 show the actual change in employment share for each 
occupation as well as the split into a within-industry and between-industry com-
ponent, as was already shown in columns 2, 5, and 6 of Table 1 respectively. The 
remaining columns of Table 4 show the predictions of our model obtained from 
equation (13) while using an estimate of 0.42 for ε together with the point estimates 
in column 3 of Table 3. Column 4 of Table 4 shows the predicted total, column 5 the 
predicted within-industry and column 6 the predicted between-industry changes in 
occupational employment shares. Because the RTI index is much more important in 
column 3 of Table 3 almost all of these changes come from the RTI variable.
A comparison of columns 1 and 4 shows that our model explains most of overall 
job polarization. For the group of the eight highest-paid occupations, our model pre-
dicts an increase in employment share that is 79 percent (4.45/5.62) of the increase 
actually observed. For the group of nine middling occupations, the model predicts 
15 Also note that equation (12) predicts that employment shares in routine and offshorable industries decrease 
if ε < 1.
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a decrease that is 74 percent (6.86/9.27) of the total observed employment share 
decrease. Lastly, our framework predicts an increase for the group of four  lowest-paid 
occupations that is 66 percent (2.41/3.65) of the observed increase. Columns 2, 3, 
5, and 6 of Table 4 show that the model also does a good job in explaining within-
industry as well as between-industry job polarization.16 To see this more clearly, 
Figure 1 presents scatter plots by occupation of the actual and predicted overall 
changes in employment shares (panel A) as well as their  within-industry (panel B) 
16 Table 4 does not explicitly show by how much between-industry job polarization is attenuated by shifting 
consumer demands, as we argued above. However, given an estimate for ε of 0.42, we must have that for each 
occupation the attenuation effect is 42 percent of the between-industry effect for ε = 0. For example, the between-
industry effect for the group of eight highest paid occupations is 0.90 which is the sum of 1.55 (if industry outputs 
are assumed fixed, i.e., ε = 0) and an attenuation effect of −0.65 (= −1.55 × 0.42).
Table 4—Actual and Predicted Percentage Point Changes in the Shares of Hours Worked, 1993–2010
    Actual changes Predicted changes
  ISCO Total Within Between Total Within Between
Occupations ranked by mean European wage code (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High-paying occupations   5.62 3.11 2.51 4.45 3.56 0.90
Corporate managers 12 0.59 0.49 0.10 0.51 0.73 −0.22
Physical, mathematical, and engineering
 professionals
21 1.36 1.11 0.25 0.20 0.42 −0.22
Life science and health professionals 22 0.57 0.23 0.34 0.78 0.22 0.56
Other professionals 24 1.38 0.67 0.71 0.44 0.31 0.13
Managers of small enterprises 13 0.17 −0.03 0.19 1.33 0.91 0.42
Physical, mathematical, and engineering
 associate professionals 
31 0.21 0.22 −0.01 0.13 0.35 −0.22
Other associate professionals 34 0.79 0.27 0.53 0.38 0.59 −0.21
Life science and health associate professionals 32 0.55 0.14 0.41 0.69 0.03 0.66
Middling occupations   −9.27 −4.77 −4.50 −6.86 −3.65 −3.21
Stationary plant and related operators 81 −0.25 0.06 −0.31 −0.36 0.00 −0.36
Metal, machinery, and related trade work 72 −2.08 −0.81 −1.26 −1.33 −0.30 −1.03
Drivers and mobile plant operators 83 −0.48 −0.11 −0.38 1.33 1.13 0.20
Office clerks 41 −2.06 −2.34 0.28 −3.63 −3.33 −0.30
Precision, handicraft, craft printing, and related
 trade workers
73 −0.54 −0.30 −0.24 −0.55 −0.27 −0.28
Extraction and building trades workers 71 −0.64 0.39 −1.03 0.74 0.19 0.54
Customer service clerks 42 0.06 −0.14 0.20 −0.52 −0.39 −0.13
Machine operators and assemblers 82 −1.63 −0.56 −1.07 −1.32 −0.17 −1.15
Other craft and related trade workers 74 −1.66 −0.96 −0.69 −1.22 −0.51 −0.71
               
Low-paying occupations   3.65 1.66 1.99 2.41 0.10 2.31
Laborers in mining, construction, 
 manufacturing, and transport
93 −0.55 0.01 −0.55 −0.39 −0.19 −0.20
Personal and protective service workers 51 2.36 0.65 1.71 2.33 0.32 2.01
Models, salespersons, and demonstrators 52 −0.11 0.29 −0.40 0.03 0.03 0.00
Sales and service elementary occupations 91 1.95 0.72 1.23 0.44 −0.06 0.50
Notes: Occupations are ordered by their mean wage across the 16 European countries across all years. Employment 
pooled across countries; long difference over 1993–2010. Predicted changes are constructed from equation (13) 
using an estimate of 0.42 for the elasticity of product demand together with point estimates in column 3 of Table 3 
accounting for the simultaneous impacts of RBTC as well as offshoring.
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Figure 1. Actual versus Predicted Employment Share Changes (Continued)
2524 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW AugusT 2014
and between-industry (panel C) components taken from Table 4.17 Overall, our 
model and results suggest that RBTC and offshoring explain much of job polariza-
tion and its within-industry and between-industry components, although the results 
certainly leave room for additional factors to play a role.
V. Conclusions
The employment structure in Western Europe has been polarizing with rising 
employment shares for high-paid professionals and managers as well as low-paid 
personal service workers and falling employment shares of manufacturing and 
routine office workers. The paper establishes that job polarization is pervasive 
across European economies in the period 1993–2010 and has within-industry and 
 between-industry components that are both important. We develop a framework that 
builds on existing models but allows us to account for the different channels by 
which routine-biased technological change and offshoring affect the structure of 
employment. In particular, we decompose the total change in employment shares by 
occupation into a within-industry and a between-industry component in a way that 
is economically meaningful. We show that our economic model explains a sizable 
part not just of overall job polarization but also the split into within-industry and 
between-industry components.
17 In online Appendix E we replicate Table 4 and Figure 1 twice. Firstly, using point estimates in column 4 of 
Table 3, thereby using the estimated impact of RBTC unconditional on offshoring. Results are very similar to those 
presented in Table 4 and Figure 1. Secondly, using point estimates in column 5 of Table 3, thereby using the esti-
mated impact of offshoring unconditional on RBTC. Given that our RTI and offshorability measures are correlated, 
offshoring while not conditioning on RBTC does appear to have some explanatory power but it is noticeable that the 
fit is poorer e.g., offshoring cannot explain the decline in the employment share of office clerks within industries.
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